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Abstract
Background: We report on an outbreak in a surgical, interdisciplinary intensive care unit (ICU) of a tertiary care
hospital. We detected a cluster of ICU patients colonized or infected with multidrug-resistant Pseudomonas
aeruginosa. We established an outbreak investigation team, performed an exploratory epidemiological analysis and
initiated an epidemiology-based intervention.
Methods: As part of the outbreak investigation, we performed microbiological examinations of the sinks in the
patient rooms and a retrospective case-control study. All patients admitted to the outbreak ICU between January
2012 and February 2014 were included. Cases were patients colonized with the outbreak strain. Controls were
patients with a different Pseudomonas aeruginosa strain. Risk factors were evaluated using multivariable conditional
logistic regression analysis. Strain typing was performed using the repetitive element-based polymerase chain
reaction (rep-PCR) DiversiLab system.
Results: The outbreak strain was found in the sinks of five (of 16) patient rooms. Altogether 21 cases and 21 (randomly
selected) controls were included. In the univariate analysis, there was no significant difference in baseline data of
the patients. In the multivariate analysis, stay in a room with a colonized sink (Odds Ratio[OR] 11.2, p = 0.007) and
hemofiltration (OR 21.9, p = 0.020) were independently associated with an elevated risk for colonization or infection by
the outbreak strain. In a subsequent evaluation of the work procedures associated with hemofiltration, we found that
the ultra-filtrate bags had been on average five times per day emptied in the sinks of the patient rooms and were used
multiple for the same patient. We exchanged the traps of the contaminated sinks and eliminated work procedures
involving sinks in patient rooms by implementation of single use bags, which are emptied outside patient rooms to
reduce splash water at the sinks. In the 20 month follow-up period, the outbreak strain was detected only once, which
indicated that the outbreak had been ceased (incidence 0.75% vs. 0.04%, p < 0.001) Furthermore, the incidence of
Pseudonomas aeruginosa overall was significantly decreased (2.5% vs. 1.5%, p < 0.001).
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Conclusion: In ICUs, limiting work processes involving sinks results in reduced multidrug-resistant Pseudomonas
aeruginosa rates. ICUs with high rates of Pseudomonas aeruginosa should consider eliminating work processes that
involve sinks and potentially splash water in close proximity to patients.
Trial registration: All data were surveillance based data which were obtained within the German Law on Protection
against Infection (“Infektionsschutzgesetz”). Therefore a trial registration was not required.
Keywords: Outbreak, Intensive care unit, Pseudomonas aeruginosa, Health care-associated infection
Background
Multidrug-resistant (MDR) P. aeruginosa are among the
most commonly-found organisms which cause nosocomial
infections in intensive care units [12, 13, 18, 21]. They are
associated with increased mortality as well as increased
hospital costs [14]. P. aeruginosa is a hydrophilic Gram-
negative rod often found in water drainage systems in
hospitals [17]. The organism has further been described as
extremely adaptable to selective pressure caused by anti-
microbial agents [13]. Due to the substantial necessity of
antimicrobial therapy in intensive care units (ICU), the se-
lective pressure in this setting is considerably high. This is
supported by the finding that antimicrobial therapy prior to
an ICU stay increases the risk for colonization with MDR
P. aeruginosa [8, 15]. Once the organisms are introduced
into an ICU, they can cause outbreaks that are often associ-
ated with sinks or faucets as a continuous source of further
spread [1, 2, 11, 19, 20]. However, the most likely transmis-
sion route is direct person-to-person contact [10].
We report on an outbreak of MDR P. aeruginosa in an
interdisciplinary ICU of a tertiary care, university hospital.
The unit was comprised of 16 rooms with 30 intensive
care beds. Within the scope of our infection control as-
signment, we collected all multidrug resistant organisms
(MDRO) isolated from clinical or screening cultures and
stored them in our MDRO bank. Whenever an epidemio-
logical link between these MDRO isolates is suspected,
molecular strain typing is performed. By this means, a
cluster of MDR P. aeruginosa strains was observed in
December 2013. Because the strain typing results sug-
gested a clonal relationship, we subsequently re-cultured
earlier MDR P. aeruginosa isolates from the frozen
MDRO bank of our institute since January 2012. Further-
more, we decided to initiate an investigation to control
the outbreak, find the transmission route, eliminate the
potential source, and avoid future clusters.
Methods
The outbreak and the subsequent analysis was performed
in a tertiary care university hospital with over 3000 beds.
The outbreak ward was a surgical intensive care unit with
30 beds. All beds were equipped for intubation and venti-
lator support. The patient beds were distributed over 16
rooms. Each room was equipped with one clinical hand
hygiene sink (Fig. 1). The sinks consisted of ceramic wash-
basin with chrome-plated tap made of metal and an at-
tached downstream bacterial filter. Together with the rest
of the room, the surfaces of the sinks were cleaned at least
twice daily. The Sinks were also used for bathing and
grooming the patients.
For the suspected outbreak, an outbreak investigation
team was established comprised of two infection control
physicians, one infection control nurse, the attending in-
tensive care physician of the ward, and a microbiologist.
Because all MDRO isolates were routinely collected and
frozen, we were able to examine retrospectively all MDR
P. aeruginosa isolates from the affected ward for the 2
years prior to the start of the outbreak investigation. P.
aeruginosa isolates detected at least 72 h after admission
to the ward were classified as ward-associated.
Microbiological methods and clinical and environmental
sampling
Clinical and environmental samples including identification
on species level and antimicrobial susceptibility testing were
performed by the VITEK 2 system (bioMérieux) and were
interpreted according to European Committee on Anti-
microbial Susceptibility Testing definitions (EUCAST,
http://www.eucast.org). Phenotypical categorization of the
outbreak strain as MDR (multidrug-resistant) was per-
formed using standard definitions [13]. Rep-PCR was per-
formed on all available clinical and environmental MDR P.
aeruginosa isolates derived from the ICU between 1st Janu-
ary 2012 and December 31, 2015. Isolates with rep-PCR
profiles yielding a similarity of >95% were considered
clonally related [6]. In order to detect outbreak clusters, we
performed rep-PCR of all MDR P. aeruginosa isolates from
clinical specimens of the respective ward between 1st
January 2012 and the intervention on April 30, 2014. As a
follow up, the analysis was repeated until December 31,
2015 comparing new MDR P. aeruginosa strains to a
reference outbreak strain from the initially discovered
cluster. In order to assess the likelihood of environmental
contamination and subsequent spread, the sinks of all
patient rooms in the respective ward were probed using
sterile cotton swabs. The MDR P. aeruginosa isolates
collected environmentally were also compared to the ref-
erence outbreak rep-PCR profile. Rep-PCR was performed
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with the DiversiLab-System (BioMerieux) [5], using Pear-
son correlation coefficient pairwise pattern matching and
the unweighted pair group method with arithmetic mean
(UPGMA) clustering algorithm.
Exploratory case-control-study
We conducted a retrospective case-control-study. The
initial base cohort was comprised of all patients that
were found (for the first time during their hospital stay)
to be colonized or infected with P. aeruginosa 48 h after
admission to the ICU. As a result these strains were
considered ward-associated. All patients admitted to the
outbreak ICU during the ongoing outbreak between 1st
January 2012 and 30th April 2014 were included. Cases
were defined as patients with either a colonization or
infection by the MDR P. aeruginosa outbreak strain.
Controls were patients colonized or infected with any P.
aeruginosa strain other than the outbreak strain. The
controls were randomly selected from the respective
sub-cohort of all potential controls (n = 78). Risk factors
for colonization were collected by means of a retrospect-
ive analysis of the patients’ records. Risk factors were
extracted for the period between admission to the ward
and P. aeruginosa detection. The following basic
epidemiological parameters were collected: age, gender,
overall length of stay on the ward, stay in a single or
shared room as well as following risk factors for acquisi-
tion of the outbreak strain: surgical drainage from any
Fig. 1 Overview of the outbreak ward including rooms with colonized sinks
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body site, dialysis or hemofiltration, invasive intubation,
central venous catheter (CVC), time (days) before P.
aeruginosa detection, severity of diseases (SAPS II), stay
in a room with a colonized sink, clinically diagnosed P.
aeruginosa infection, tracheal cannula, leukopenia, ad-
ministration of an immunosuppressive drug, shock as
defined by intensive care medicine definitions [3], anti-
microbial therapy, and contact with a patient colonized
with the outbreak strain.
Statistical methods
Differences were tested by Chi-square or Wilcoxon rank
sum test in a univariate analysis. A multivariable analysis
was performed to estimate the effect of factors independ-
ently associated with colonization by the outbreak strain
using a stepwise forward conditional logistic regression.
Included in the multivariable analysis were all parameters
with a p-value ≤ 0.100 in the univariate analysis. The
p-values for including a variable in the multivariable
model was ≤0.05 and for excluding >0.05. Odds ratios
(OR) and their 95% confidence intervals (CI 95%) were
calculated. All analyses were performed using SPSS (IBM).
Results
Between 1st January, 2012 and 30th April 2014 altogether
135 P. aeruginosa-colonized or infected patients were
found on the respective ward. The mean length of stay in
the outbreak ICU during this time period was 6.34 days.
Based on the results of the rep-PCR examination, we
found a cluster of 26 patients overall, colonized with the
same MDR PAE strain (Fig. 2). This strain showed a
phenotypical resistance to acylureidopenicillins, 3rd gener-
ation cephalosporins, quinolones and carbapenems. One
MDR PAE isolate from March 2014 could not be retrieved
for rep-PCR and was excluded from the analysis. The
cases were more or less homogeneously scattered over the
total study period of 28 months, with a period of 5 months
between February and June 2012 during which no MDR
PAE were observed (Fig. 2). The typing results and the
epidemiological curve suggested a continuous outbreak
with a single MDR PAE strain that had lasted since at least
January 2012. Hence, we performed environmental exami-
nations of all sinks located in patients’ rooms. Altogether,
five sinks were colonized with MDR PAE. Rep-PCR
showed that all five isolates were identical to the outbreak
strain (Fig. 1).
For five of the 26 cases, sufficient data was not avail-
able at the time of the analysis. For the remaining 21
cases (81%), we conducted a case control study using
one control per case. Table 1 shows the results of the
univariate analysis of all collected parameters for cases
and controls. There was no statistically significant differ-
ence in age, sex or severity of disease (SAPS II). Among
controls, 42.9% (9/21) were colonized with a MDR P.
aeruginosa different from the outbreak strain. Further-
more, 66.7% (n = 14) of the cases and 28.6% (n = 6) of
the controls had been located in one of the rooms with
a sink colonized with the outbreak strain (p = 0.062; see
Table 1). In the multivariable analysis, stay in a room
with a colonized sink and dialysis/hemofiltration showed
an increased risk for acquisition of the outbreak strain
(Table 2).
In order to prevent further spread of the outbreak
strain, we replaced the traps of the affected sinks and
implemented single use hemofiltration bags and empty-
ing was performed outside patient rooms. Furthermore,
we performed additional training in hand hygiene and
education of potential transmission routes for the ward’s
staff. As a follow up, we analyzed the detection rate and
the incidence density of MDR P. aeruginosa in clinical
specimens before and after the intervention (replace-
ment of colonized sinks/single use bags) (Table 3). After
the intervention, a significant reduction was seen in the
incidence density as well as the detection rate for the
outbreak strain. A decreased detection rate in overall
MDR P. aeruginosa clinical specimens was observed
after the intervention but also an increased incidence
density of clinical specimens.
Discussion
Patient colonization, or infection with MDR P. aeruginosa
in intensive care units is a common phenomenon [12]. It
Fig. 2 Rate of MDR P. aeruginosa in clinical specimens before and after the intervention
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Table 1 Univariate analysis of characteristics and parameter of cases and controls
Parameter Cases (n = 21) Controls (n = 21) p-value
P. aeruginosa infection; % (n) 42.9 (9) 52.4 (11) 0.758
MDR P. aeruginosa colonization; % (n) 100% (21) 42.9 (9) <0.001
SAPS II total (95%Confidence Interval [CI]) 50 (37–59) 44 (31–50) 0.147
Colonization site; % (n)
Tracheobronchial secretion 42.9 (9) 57.1 (12)
Intraabdominal swab 9.5(2) 9.5 (2)
Rectal 28.6 (6) -
Wound swab 9.5 (2) -
Urine 38.1 (8) 28.6 (6)
Blood - 4.8 (1)
Stay in a room with colonized sink; % (n) 66.7 (14) 28.6 (6) 0.062a
Contact with MDR colonized patient; % (n) 14.3 (3) -
All drainages; % (n) 42.9 (9) 61.9 (13) 0.751
Dialysis or hemofiltration 33.3 (7) 4.8 (1) 0.045a
Gastric tube 95.2 (20) 85.7 (18) 0.606
Urinary catheter 100.0 (21) 100.0 (21) 1.000
Tracheal cannula 38.1 (8) 33.3 (7) 1.000
Central venous catheter 90.5 (19) 85.7 (18) 1.000
Leukopenia 14.3 (3) 14.3 (3) 1.000
Immunosuppression 38.1 (8) 9.5 (2) 0.067a
Septic chock 19.0 (4) 28.6 (6) 0.719
Surgery patient 85.7 (18) 90.5 (19) 1.000
Neurosurgery patient 14.3 (3) 23.8 (5) 0.697
Age (years) 71.0 (55.2–78.1) 75.5 (63.4–83.4) 0.120
LOS before colonization (days) 16 (11–34) 10 (5–28) 0.190
Length of stay overall (days) 38 (23–54) 30 (10–46) 0.170
Stay in single room (days) 0 (0–5) 0 (0–9) 1.000
Stay in shared room (days) 12 (6–30) 4 (0–16) 0.031a
Penicillin; % (n) 42.9 (9) 23.8 (5) 0.362
Cephalosporin; % (n) 42.9 (9) 23.8 (5) 0.362
Carbapenem; % (n) 42.9 (9) 28.6 (6) 0.520
Quinolone; % (n) 52.4 (11) 23.8 (5) 0.111
Aminoglycoside; % (n) 28.6 (6) 4.8 (1) 0.093a
Glycopeptide; % (n) 28.6 (6) 19.0 (4) 0.719
Antibiotic inhalation; % (n) 33.3 (7) 9.5 (2) 0.130
Continuous data is displayed as median (interquartile range) and categorial data as percentage (number)
SAPS Simplified Acute Physiology Score (score for the severity of disease), LOS length of stay
aparameter was included in the multivariable regression analysis
Table 2 Results of the multivariable regression analysis
Parameter Odds ratio P-value 95%Confidence interval
Stay in a room with colonized sink 11.229 0.007 1.920–65.687
Dialysis or hemofiltration 21.874 0.020 1.628–293.910
Immunosuppression 7.868 0.057 0.942–65.736
Included in the analysis were stay in a room with colonized sink, dialysis or hemofiltration, immunosuppression, aminoglycosides. Independent factors are
displayed in bold
CI confidence interval
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is important to minimize the likelihood of transmission to
or between ICU patients. Intensive care units are high-
risk areas for nosocomial infections. Hence, ICUs require
particular infection prevention measures (different from
standard care wards) in order to take into account the ele-
vated risk of infection and transmission associated with
ICU-specific working procedures (e.g. ventilator support,
central-line catheters). Within the scope of an outbreak
investigation due to MDR PAE in an ICU, we found evi-
dence of a transmission route associated with working
procedures at sink, in particular the use of the sinks for
grooming the patients. After reducing the procedures as-
sociated with sinks in patient rooms by using single use
octenidine wash cloths [7] and the instruction to empty
ultra-filtrate bags of the hemofiltration in a sink outside
the patient room. After the implementation the outbreak
strain was detected less frequently. The increase of inci-
dence density for all MDR PAE must be seen as a result of
a post outbreak increase of microbiological screening
activities. This is underlined by the significant decline in
the detection rate per clinical specimen and the signifi-
cantly more frequent microbiological examinations after
the intervention.
Contaminated sinks or faucets have been described as
sources for P. aeruginosa outbreaks in the past [1, 2, 4, 11,
19, 20]. In many outbreaks, contaminated washbasins
served as continuous sources. From there, P. aeruginosa is
often spread further from person to person through direct
contact. Our data supports this finding. Two thirds of our
cases had a stay within a room with a colonized sink. Fur-
thermore, one third of the patients had renal replacement
therapy, such as dialysis or hemofiltration. In line with
national recommendations, the suggested procedure in
our hospital is to dispose ultra-filtrate bags via waste
rooms. While investigating on site, we found that the
ultra-filtrate bags from the dialysis or hemofiltration ma-
chines where used multiple times and emptied in the
nearest sink (Fig. 3). The ultra-filtrate bags had a filling
volume of 10 l and were changed five times per 24 h on
average. The strong statistical association of renal replace-
ment therapy with the outbreak strain could therefore re-
veal an as yet not described transmission route. However,
two-thirds of the case patients did not receive renal re-
placement therapy. Therefore, other transmission routes,
such as direct person-to-person contact, were most likely
also involved. The improvement of hand hygiene through
focused training was a key element of our outbreak con-
trol. Also splash of water from the sink into hands of staff
and contamination of medical must be taken into account.
As an outbreak control measure, we changed all contami-
nated traps and recommended to switch to single-use
ultra-filtrate bags to limit the procedures associated with
sinks located in patient rooms. However, within the subse-
quent 20 months after the reduction of working processes
Table 3 MDR P. aeruginosa incidence density and detection rate before and after intervention
Before Intervention (28 months) After Intervention (20 months) P-value
Patient days 21,324 10,874 0.255
Clinical specimen examinations n = 3,469 n = 5,388 0.008
Outbreak strain incidence density
(number/1,000 patient days)
1.22 0,18 0.001
Outbreak strain detection rate
(number/1,000 clinical specimen)
7.49 0.37 <0.001
MDR PAE incidence density
(number/1,000 patient days)
4.13 7.45 <0.001
MDR PAE detection rate
(number/1,000 clinical specimen)
25.37 15.03 <0.001
Incidence density was defined as number of specimens per 1000 patient days. Detection rate was defined as number of specimens per 1000 clinical specimen.
Clinical specimens were obtained from tracheobronchial secretions, intraabdominal swabs, rectal swabs, wound swabs, urine cultures and blood cultures. Period
prior to intervention was from 01/2012 to 04/2014, a period
Fig. 3 Example of ultra-filtrate bag and contact with sink in patient room
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associated with sinks in patient rooms, the clinical detec-
tion of the outbreak isolate as well as the incidence density
of MDR P. aeruginosa declined significantly. A study by
Hopmann et al. in the Netherlands showed a reduction of
the MDRO rate in an ICU after removing sinks from
patient rooms [9].
In the univariate analysis, prolonged stay in a shared
room was associated with the colonization by the out-
break strain. This did not turn out to be an independent
factor in the multivariable analysis. However, currently
there is an ongoing discussion whether single rooms in
ICUs have the potential to reduce nosocomial infections
[16]. As only few of the patients analyzed were infected
with P. aeruginosa, our contribution to this discussion is
limited.
Conclusion
Sinks in patient rooms in ICUs can be potential drivers
of MDR P. aeruginosa outbreaks. We were able to show
that reducing work processes involving sinks in patient
rooms result in reduced MDR P. aeruginosa rates. ICUs
with high rates of P. aeruginosa should consider elimin-
ating work processes involving sinks in proximity to
patients.
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